The Agenda : Plato's Republic!

It's well past mid-night and I just finished writing what I am about to share. But first let me briefly (and vaguely, since it actually isn't very well figured out) tell what I am up to. I bought a hard-copy of Plato's Republic just before leaving my institute and heading for home. It is supposedly a well-renowned work dealing with the subject of justice(a just individual/society/state), etc. and considered to be his greatest one (at least that's what a short note on the first page of the book states). The book is divided into 10 Books (similar to Chapters) with each one approximately 30 pages long, making the book run into 311 pages. I have read Book 1 and a few pages of Book 2. Now, this is my first (of hopefully more to come) sort of deep dive into such philosophical material and don't know how objective my appreciation for its contents is, but I can't help feeling a sense of awe while holding in my hand something which contains things written so far back in time (around mid 300 BCE) and yet, after reading some of it, finding its topics of discourse not very different from what every human being today observes around and thinks about during many occasions of his/her life.

By the way, its online version is available for free on the internet: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html This makes it rather difficult to justify my intent for sharing what I am about to share but I will nevertheless state it honestly : As of now (since I don't know whether I would like to continue with it in the future) I wish to, in the least, share my own translations of the important discussions that I find in that text in a simplified and orderly form and with as much accuracy as possible. I may give my critical comments in the process (in whatever details) or may simply refrain from doing it. There are chiefly 2 reasons that motivate me to do it: (1) I am currently finding it an interesting and yet not too much taxing (probably not for long) exercise which presents to me the opportunity to understand the book's text thoroughly if I persevere till the end and thus, something that I might feel happy about and claim with little pride afterwards. And it seems possible to do it at a convenient pace of my own (2) Some readers who might not feel comfortable with reading the original text or who might be curious to know what its contents are before committing themselves to read the full text, might benefit from these translational notes which I will try to make quite understandable for a reasonably good English reader.

The book that I have has an interesting introduction by an Indian academician, Dr. Dhananjay Singh, which instantly excited me to start reading it. I do not wish to write that here (feeling too sleepy) and the readers will have to take my word that at least Book 1 contains interesting stuff. 

Plato was a student of Socrates and Republic's text is written as a first person account of Socrates.  However, my notes are in the form of a third person account of it. I found the text quite enjoyable since its mostly in the form of dialogues which take place between Socrates and his acquaintances and friends. 

So, here are my notes of Book 1 that I finished writing and editing just before making this entry (the end of these notes will mark the end of this post since I am feeling sleepy and can't cause myself to give it a more suitable ending):

Book 1

The interesting arguments are between those of Thrasymachus and Socrates. Thrasymachus makes 2 claims: (1.1) Justice is the interest of the stronger (1.2) Justice is much less advantageous than injustice. Socrates first contradicts (1.1) by claiming that the ruling class (stronger class) is fallible and thus may falsely conceive certain provisions as serving their own interest when in fact it’s the opposite and thus, wrongly ask the subjects to obey them. The subjects, being just in obeying the rulers, would thus not be serving the interest of the rulers. To this Thrasymachus essentially adds the clarification that in as much as the rulers are astute in discerning their own interest and commanding the subjects to do their bid in favor of those interests, the subjects are just in doing what they are commanded to do. To this Socrates, by a series of dubious arguments, shows that a ruler, in the true and strictest sense of the word ‘ruler’, will actually never care for his interests but rather those of his subjects. He does this in following steps

1.  Every art has one and only one subject of its interest (e.g. the art of horsemanship is concerned with taking care of horses, art of medicine is concerned with taking care of body ailments, etc.) and it doesn’t care for itself (a little strange statement to make).

2.  Thus all arts are concerned with catering to needs of their respective objects which they serve and to no one else. In this sense the arts are superiors and their subjects of interest are weaker.

3.  The professionals of each art, in the strictest sense, thus serve only the subject of their arts. E.g. ‘no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker’

4.  By extending this trait to a ruler, it thus follows that a ruler cannot consider his own interest but only that of his subjects in order to be a true ruler.

Thrasymachus ridicules Socrates for getting to this conclusion and points out how rulers actually behave in reality. He then also gives many examples of (1.2) which I will cover later. To Thrasymachus’ retort, Socrates essentially points to him the inconsistency in his definition of the term ‘true ruler’ and ‘true artist’, and again claims that a true ruler, just like the true artist, is concerned only with the interest of its subject. But he makes the admission that in reality, the artist or the ruler does require remuneration for his work but the remuneration doesn’t change the fact that the job of the ruler/artist is that of caring for his subject. So, while the artist does receive some benefit for his work, his work produces benefits solely related to the functionality of his art and exclusive of the benefits he receives. The same is applicable to a true ruler. In fact, since people who take up work related to governing others are unwilling to do so without some form of payment, it shows that they are doing a service for others for which they demand that payment. Socrates then digresses from the argument at hand and talks of three incentives that may lead someone to take up work which involves ruling over others: (1) money, (2) honor and (3) penalty for refusing to do so. He then claims that the 3^rd incentive actually drives the ‘best of men’, for a good man will not like to do service for others for monetary gain or for ambitious motives like earning honor. He will do so only from the fear of experiencing some punishment. I think this excerpt best describes his point which interestingly makes much sense:

‘Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would but because they cannot help – not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoy themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and everyone who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one.’

I find the last line of the above excerpt quite interesting. It implies that Socrates considers a good man to have at least the following attributes: (1) he does exactly what his job requires him to do – here, being a true ruler - to not care for his own interests but those of his subjects (2) he need not necessarily be charitable, since he can make the choice of not serving others by not taking up office.

Before responding to Thrasymachus’ claim (1.2), he enquires his general view about justice and after a series of questions he gets Thrasymachus’ opinion of

• An unjust person as being ‘wise’ and ‘good’
• Injustice as ‘discretion’, ‘honorable’, ‘strong’, ‘wisdom’ and ‘virtue’
• Justice as ‘sublime simplicity’ and having other qualities opposite to that of injustice. 

First, he disproves Thrasymachus’ claim of the unjust person as being ‘good’ and ‘wise’ using the following dubious arguments and getting Thrasymachus’ approval at each step of the deductive process:

1.  A just man doesn’t try to gain any advantage over another just man but considers it just to gain advantage over the unjust (but won’t be able to, Thrasymachus adds). Whereas, the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust [as well as the just] in order that he may have more than all.

2.  Rephrasing (1): the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than his like and his unlike.

3.  Socrates then takes examples of arts for illustrating something - a musician, when adjusting the strings of a musical instrument, will not desire or claim to do it better than another musician whereas he will than a non-musician. Similarly, a physician, while prescribing treatment to his patients will not wish to go beyond another physician in the practice of medicine but will certainly claim to go beyond a non-physician in doing so. Just like the cases of musician and physician, a knowledgeable person will not desire or claim to know or say more than another knowledgeable person but will definitely desire or claim to know more than an ignorant person. But the ignorant person will desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant.

4.   The knowing is wise. The wise is good. So, from (3) it follows that the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite. Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both.

5.  Comparing the characteristics of a just and unjust person with those of knowledgeable and ignorant person, Socrates concludes that the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the evil and ignorant and subsequently claims that it thus follows that the just is wise and good and the unjust is evil and ignorant.

Second, he deduces that since wisdom is stronger than ignorance so justice (being wisdom and virtue) is stronger than injustice (being ignorance) and thereby disproves another of Thrasymachus’ claim that justice is weaker than injustice.

Third, he further elucidates other consequences of injustice and its connection to Thrasymachus’ claim that the unjust have many more advantages than the just. He takes the case of a hypothetical State which dominates and enslaves other states in an unjust manner and examines whether that State would be able to exert that power with or without justice. To answer this, he points out that a State, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves or any other gang of evil-doers cannot act in unity if they injure one another. He further points out that injustice has a tendency to create divisions and provoke hatred wherever it is present, whereas justice imparts harmony and friendship. This view is captured well in the following excerpt:

‘Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just?’

This leads him to conclude that evil men, who work together to commit great crimes of injustice, are in reality not perfectly evil men since then they would not have been able to act in unison, but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine.

Finally Socrates proceeds with properly refuting Thrasymachus’ claim (1.2) that ‘Justice is much less advantageous than injustice’. He does this by first stating (and getting Thrasymachus to understand and agree) that anything to which an end is appointed has an excellence. For illustration, he gives examples of an eye and an ear. One cannot see without an eye or hear without an ear. Thus, to see and to hear are the respective ends (or functions) of an eye and an ear. If the eyes do not maintain their excellence (i.e. they do not function well) and have some defect, then they do not meet their ends which is to provide sight. Similarly, ears which are devoid of their excellence won’t meet their ends of making it possible to hear. Socrates claims this applies to every other thing which has an end, including a person’s soul. Here, Socrates doesn’t explicitly state the definition of soul but he regards the ends of a person’s soul as giving life to a person and causing him to superintend and command and deliberate and the like (as a side point, he concludes that because soul causes one to superintend, an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent and the good soul a good ruler). And similar to the eyes and ears, a soul will not fulfill her own ends when deprived of her excellence. Socrates then asserts (with Thrasymachus agreeing) that justice is the excellence of the soul and injustice is the defect of the soul. Since life is one of the ends of the soul, a just soul (and thus, a just person) will have that end met completely because a just soul retains its excellence, which means that he will live well. On the other hand, by same reasoning an unjust man will live ill. This is the subsequent conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus 

S: And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

T: Certainly.

S: Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

T: So be it.

S: But happiness and not misery is profitable.

T: Of course.

S: Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

At the end of these arguments Socrates laments that his original intent of finding the nature of justice has still not been fulfilled despite all these discussions:

‘I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.’